Divided We Stand: Concerted Activity and the Maturing of the NLRA by George, B. Glenn
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1988
Divided We Stand: Concerted Activity and the
Maturing of the NLRA
B. Glenn George
Copyright c 1988 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
George, B. Glenn, "Divided We Stand: Concerted Activity and the Maturing of the NLRA" (1988). Faculty Publications. Paper 853.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/853
Divided We Stand: Concerted Activity 
and the Maturing of the NLRA 
B. Glenn George* 
[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within 
the statute, because not within its spirit .... 1 
Robert Ewing was laid off in 1980 from his job as a piledriver 
operator with Herbert F. Darling, Inc.2 A month before the layoff, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) con-
ducted an inspection of the jobsite at which Mr. Ewing worked. 
Darling refused to recall Mr. Ewing because of the belief that Mr. 
Ewing's complaint to OSHA initiated the inspection. The company 
was mistaken. The OSHA inspection was not prompted by a com-
plaint. Neither Mr. Ewing nor any other employee was responsible. 
Yet the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) con-
cluded that Darling had committed no unfair labor practice. Mr. 
Ewing was fired lawfully under the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA or the Act).3 
Copyright© 1988 by B. Glenn George. 
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law (College ofWilliam 
and Mary). B.A. 1975, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; J.D. 1978, Harvard 
Law School. An earlier draft of this Article was presented at a faculty colloquium at 
Case Western Reserve University Law School on April 6, 1987. The author would like 
to thank the faculty of Case Western Reserve for their helpful comments. Thanks are 
also due to Betty Abele for the speed and accuracy with which she typed numerous 
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I. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967). 
2. The facts of Robert Ewing's discharge are taken from Herbert F. Darling, Inc., 
267 N.L.R.B. 476 (1983), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ewing v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 1117 (2d 
Cir.), aff'd on reh'g, 273 N.L.R.B. 346 (1984), remanded, 768 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985), 
reaff'd, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 1977-1988 NLRD Dec. (CCH) 1! 19,237 (Feb. 29, 1988). 
3. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-169 (1982). 
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Kenneth Prill suffered a similar fate.4 Mr. Prill was a truck driver 
for Meyers Industries. Mr. Prill complained to his employer on sev-
eral occasions about the brakes and steering on his equipment. Mr. 
Prill's trailer was cited for several defects by an Ohio inspection sta-
tion after Mr. Prill had experienced more problems with the brakes. 
The brakes failed again on a trip through Tennessee, resulting in an 
accident. Mr. Prill telephoned the company and was told to get the 
trailer back "as best he could."5 Mr. Prill instead contacted the 
Tennessee Public Service Commission. The inspection by the Com-
mission required that the trailer be taken out of service because of 
faulty brakes and damage to the trailer hitch. Mr. Prill was fired 
when he returned home for "calling the cops like this all the time."6 
The Board found the termination lawful under the Act. 7 
The problem, in a word, is the "concerted" nature of these indi-
viduals' activities. Section 7 of the NLRA grants to employees "the 
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."8 Under the Board's 
current interpretation of the scope of Section 7, the participation of 
more than one employee is required to satisfy the "concerted" lan-
guage of the statute. Mr. Ewing and Mr. Prill regrettably failed to 
obtain partners for their real or imagined activities. No one ques-
tions that two employees acting together under identical circum-
stances would be immune from discharge for their safety 
complaints.9 The employee who acts alone, however, may be risk-
ing her job. 
The concert requirement is a troubling one, particularly when 
highlighted by the sympathetic plights of real people like Robert 
Ewing and Kenneth Prill. The reaction of both lawyers and laymen 
is likely to be, "That's not fair." Yet to say that legal relief is needed 
is not to say that the NLRA is or should be the source of that relief. 
Mr. Ewing, for example, may be protected under OSHA provisions 
that prohibit retaliatory discharge for employee complaints or par-
ticipation in OSHA inspections. 1° Comparable protection was un-
available for Mr. Prill, however. 11 No systematic coverage exists to 
4. The facts of Kenneth Prill's discharge are taken from Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers 
/), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497-98 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985), reaff'd, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 
1137 (1986}, aff'd, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
5. 268 N.L.R.B. at 497. 
6. !d. at 498. 
7. /d. at 498-99. 
8. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (emphasis added). Employer interference 
with section 7 rights constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 8(a}(1), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(1) (1982). 
9. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982). 
11. Section 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 might have 
protected Mr. Prill today, but the Act was not in force at the time of his discharge. See 
Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, tit. IV, § 405, 96 
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shield the lone employee seeking to improve her working 
conditions. 
One is compelled to look to the NLRA for assistance, and it seems 
a natural source. As the first comprehensive legislation creating and 
protecting employee rights, the NLRA could be described optimisti-
cally as a bill of rights for the American worker. 12 Viewed in a broad 
perspective, the Act appears to be an appropriate place to seek pro-
tection of an employee's right to communicate job-related concerns 
to her employer. 
To state that the Act should protect the voice of the individual is 
not to establish that it does. The current Board reads the statutory 
protection of "concerted activities" narrowly. 13 Certainly nothing 
in the language of section 7 demands the protection of the lone em-
ployee, yet neither does section 7 explicitly forbid the inclusion of a 
single employee's complaint. In the context of an organized shop, 
the Supreme Court in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems 14 recently re-
jected a literal reading of the term "concerted" and protected a sin-
gle employee's attempt to enforce a provision of a collective 
bargaining agreement. 15 
This Article proposes that a preoccupation with section 7 termi-
nology is misplaced. "Statutory interpretation requires more than 
concentration upon isolated words." 16 The protection of the single 
voice must be evaluated not in terms of the various rights created by 
the Act, but in terms of the structure of the Act and the process estab-
lished for employee-management relationships. From this perspec-
tive, the Board's rigid insistence that activity be "concerted" 
weakens and distorts the existing structure of the statutory scheme. 
The protection of the individual's right of communication is a nec-
essary corollary of the Act's structure. 
Pursuing a structural approach, rather than the Board's literal in-
terpretation of the term "concerted," admittedly presents dangers. 
The apparent injustice to Mr. Ewing and Mr. Prill might prompt one 
to characterize the statutory provisions unfairly in order to reach a 
desired result. The protection of employees who find themselves in 
similar dilemmas may be the "right" result, but the "rightness" 
Stat. 2097, 2157 (1983) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305 (1982 & Supp. 
III 1985)). 
12. See Klare, judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal 
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 270-93 (1978); Summers, Past Premises, 
Present Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 BUFFALO L. REv. 9, 9-13 (1982) 
[hereinafter Summers, Past PremiSes]; Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled 
Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 29, 29-34 (1979) [hereinafter Summers, Industrial 
Democracy]. 
13. See infra notes 45-51, 53-55 and accompanying text. 
14. 465 u.s. 822 (1984). 
15. Id. at 825. 
16. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970). 
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must be justified. In this instance, thatjustification depends on how 
one regards the statute and defines its role. 
Although the NLRA usually is viewed as the law governing union-
management relations, it always has provided some protection for 
non-union and unrepresented employees protesting working condi-
tions.17 As unionization continues to decline, 18 the future signifi-
cance of the Act will depend on the perception of the legislation as 
static or dynamic. Having reached its fiftieth anniversary, the Act 
has been the target of substantial criticism. Some claim that we are 
too far removed from the political climate of 1935 for the Act to 
remain an effective tool. 19 Congress intentionally drafted the NLRA 
in broad and general terms, however, to ensure its adaptability to 
changes in the workplace. 20 The workplace is now largely unorgan-
ized. The continued viability of the Act may depend, in part, on the 
willingness of the Board to shift its focus to the non-union 
workforce. This opportunity is present within the Act's existing 
structure and, indeed, this Article contends, is compelled by that 
structure - the "spirit" of the NLRA. 
The examination of this problem begins with a brief summary of 
the Board's development of concerted activity protection.21 This 
Article then reviews the judicial response, focusing on the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc. 22 and 
the growing circuit court controversy over the current Board's redi-
rection in this area. This Article reexamines the problem by consid-
ering the limitations of traditional statutory construction and the 
potential elucidation of a structural analysis. By concentrating on 
the processes of labor relations under the NLRA, this Article con-
cludes that protection of the individual under appropriate circum-
stances is a necessary part of the Act's existing structure. 
I. Setting the Stage 
A. NLRB Development 
Read literally, the section 7 requirement that activity be concerted 
would protect only groups of two or more employees acting 
17. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); Walls Mfg. Co. v. 
NLRB, 321 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963). 
18. See infra note 157; see also Rees, The Size of Union Membership in Manufacturing in the 
1980s, in THE SHRINKING PERIMETER 43-44 (H. Juris & M. Roomkin eds. 1980). 
19. See infra note 158. 
20. See NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975); see also infra note 120. 
21. The development of case law in this area, through both the Board and the 
courts, has been reviewed extensively elsewhere and need not be repeated here. See, e.g., 
Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor 
Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 286, 289-328 (1981); Note, Protection of Individual Action 
as "Concerted Activity" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CoRNELL L. REv. 369, 377-
86 (1983); Note, National Labor Relations Act Section 7: Protecting Employee Activity Through 
Implied Concert of Action, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 813, 816-36 (1981) [hereinafter Northwestern 
Note]. For a thorough judicial discussion of the case law, see Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 
941,945-56 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985). For the purposes of this Arti-
cle, the case law development will be highlighted only as necessary to set the framework 
for the discussion that follows. · 
22. 465 u.s. 822 (1984). 
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together. Two or more employees joindy protesting working condi-
tions are acting unquestionably in "concert" within the meaning of 
Section 7.23 The "protected" nature of the employees' behavior is 
the only issue to be addressed. Although engaged in concerted ac-
tivity, employees may lose the Act's protection if their conduct is 
illegal, unreasonably disruptive, or in violation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement.24 Yet as long as at least two employees act to-
gether, the concert requirement is met automatically. Had Mr. 
Ewing and Mr. Prill faced their employers with the support of fellow 
employees, their discharges would have been improper. 
Even in its current retrenchment, however, the Board does not 
read section 7 as narrowly as it might be construed. A single em-
ployee complaining to her employer is engaged in concerted activity 
if she was designated a spokesman by one or more other employ-
ees.25 Similarly, the Board continues to protect an individual's ef-
forts to enlist the support of other employees concerning work-
related issues. 26 In the well-known Mushroom Transportation Com-
pany 27 case, the Third Circuit supported protection of individual ac-
tivity "with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for 
group action" or when the activity "had some relation to group ac-
tion in the interest of the employees."28 Thus, a sole employee's 
23. See, e.g., Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980); Jim Causley 
Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1980); Meyers Indus., Inc. (Me)·ers /), 268 
N.L.R.B. 493, remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 948 (1985), reaff'd, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137 (1986), aff'd, 
835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir 1987); Traylor-Pamco, 154 N.L.R.B. 380 (1965); Root-Carlin, 
Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313 (1951); cf. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984) 
("Although one could interpret the phrase, 'to engage in other concerted activities,' to 
refer to a situation in which two or more employees are working together at the same 
time and the same place toward a common goal, the language of § 7 does not confine 
itself to such a narrow meaning."). 
24. See, e.g., NLRB v. Locall229, International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 
472 (1953) (discharges for disloyalty upheld); Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 
48 (1942) (unlawful activity); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 258-
59 (1939) (violence); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) (breach of contract); 
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 1970) (insubordina-
tion); Yellow Freight Sys., 247 N.L.R.B. 177, 181 (1980) (insubordination); Peck, Inc., 
226 N.L.R.B. 1174, 1174 (1976) (employees properly terminated for refusing to leave 
the plant and preventing employer from closing at end of shift);J.P. Stevens & Co., 219 
N.L.R.B. 850, 850 (1975) (employer lawfully discharged 22 employees who disrupted 
meeting to discuss anti-union sentiments), enforced, 547 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1976). 
25. See Dollar Branch Coal Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 428, 429 (1984); Meyers I, 268 
N.L.R.B. at 497 (1984), remanded, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 
(1985); Hitchiner Mfg. Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 927, 940-41 (1979); Wilson Freight Co., 234' 
N.L.R.B. 844,847 (1978), enforcement denied, 604 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 
U.S. 962 (1980); Barnsider, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 754, 760 (1972). Other types of individ-
ual activity are expressly referenced by Section 7, including the rights to join or assist a 
labor organization. See NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). 
26. See, e.g., Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313, 1314 (1951); Central Steel Tube 
Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 604, 612-13, enforced, 139 F.2d 489 (8th Cir. 1943). 
27. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964). 
28. /d. at 685. The Mushroom Transportation standard was widely adopted by other 
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attempts to organize a union or circulate a petition protesting work-
ing conditions are considered protected concerted activity. The 
current Board recently affirmed its adherence to the Mushroom 
Transportation standard. 29 
The existence of a collective bargaining agreement may provide 
the lone employee additional protection. The so-called "Interboro 
doctrine" was introduced almost twenty-five years ago. 30 In the 
landmark decision of lnterboro Contractors, Inc., 31 affirmed by the Sec-
ond Circuit, the Board interpreted section 7 as shielding an individ-
ual employee who asserts a right contained in a collective 
bargaining agreement. Under the Board's rationale, the claim of a 
collectively bargained right operates as an extension of the con-
certed action in negotiating the contract32 and affects the rights of 
all employees covered by the agreement. 33 
The Board reached the watershed of protection for concerted ac-
tivity in 197 5 by extending the Interboro doctrine to the assertion of 
statutory employee rights. In Alleluia Cushion Co., 34 the Board de-
clared unlawful the discharge of an employee for filing a complaint 
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The Board reasoned 
that the NLRA should support public policy declared through other 
employee protection statutes.35 According to the Board, this sup-
port is guaranteed by protecting the employee who asserts her right 
under the statute or, as sometimes referred to, acts as an "implied 
spokesman" for all employees affected by the statute. In later cases, 
the Board justified its position by emphasizing the deterrent effect 
on other employees if an employer were permitted to terminate the 
complaining employee for claiming a statutory right or benefit. 36 
circuit courts, although interpretations and applications of the doctrine have varied. See, 
e.g., NLRB v. Datapoint Corp., 642 F.2d 123, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1981) (individual com-
plaints did not constitute concerted activity in absence of "substantial evidence" of in-
tent to instigate group action); Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 28-29 (7th 
Cir. 1980) ("personal griping" about overtime unprotected even though other employ-
ees made similar complaints); Randolph Div., Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706, 
708 (1st Cir. 1975) (individual complaints concerning interest in union organization 
were protected); Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th 
Cir. 1969) (activities intended to enlist support of other employees to protest working 
conditions protected as concerted). 
29. See Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1142 (1986) (dic-
tum) ("To clarify, we intend that Meyers I be read as fully embracing the view of con-
certedness exemplified by the Mushroam Transportation line of cases. We reiterate, our 
definition of concerted activity in Meyers I encompasses those circumstances where indi-
viduals seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action."), aff'd sub nom. Prill 
v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Walter Bruckner & Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 
1306, 1306 n.6 (1984); Vought Corp., 273 N.L.R.B. 1290, 1294 (1984). 
30. See Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 1518 (1962). 
31. 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). 
32. See 139 N.L.R.B. at 1519. 
33. See Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298. 
34. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975). 
35. See id. at 1000. 
36. See, e.g., Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1053 (1979) 
(worker's compensation claim), enforcement denied, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980); Self Cy-
cle & Marine Distrib. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 75, 76 (1978) (unemployment compensation 
claim). ' 
Other cases in which the Board protected agency complaints as concerted activity 
514 (VOL. 56:509 
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The Board extended the implied spokesman concept of Alleluia 
even further in subsequent cases involving common employee con-
cerns where no statutory right was at issue. The complaint of one 
employee was deemed concerted in circumstances where other em-
ployees discussed or expressed the same dissatisfaction. 37 Com-
mentators suggested this rationale could be carried so far as to 
include any employee complaint which could be a concern to other 
employees or which would affect other employees.38 Although the 
Board's language in these cases might justify such an expansive 
reading,39 the facts of the cases do not. Upon closer examination, 
the cases cited for this proposition consistently include substantial 
evidence that the complaint in question was in fact shared by other 
employees. The employee discharged could be fairly characterized 
as an informal, volunteer spokesman. 
In Sullair P. T.O., Inc., 40 for example, an employee was discharged 
include Apollo Tire Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1627, 1633 (1978) (U.S. Department of Labor), 
aff'd sub nom. NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979); Flynn 
Paving Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 721, 722 (1978) (Michigan Civil Rights Commission); B & P 
Motors Express, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 653, 655 (1977) (Department of Transportation); 
and Triangle Tool & Eng'g, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1354, 1354 (1976) (Wage and Hour 
Division). 
37. See, e.g., Sullair P.T.O., Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 614, 616 (1980) (discussed infra at 
notes 40-41 and accompanying text), enforcement denied, 641 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1981); 
Ontario Knife Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (1980) (two employees complained about 
work assignment, one walked out in protest), enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 
1980); Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1351 (1978) (single employee walked out 
after group discussion of pay and working conditions); Fairmont Hotel Co., 230 
N.L.R.B. 874, 878 (1977) (employee acting as "spokesman" to complain about tipping 
arrangements); Diagnostic Center Hosp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1217 (1977) (em-
ployee discharged unlawfully for writing letter protesting salaries, where other employ-
ees had expressed similar concern); Oklahoma Allied Tel. Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 916, 920-
21 (1974) (discharge for complaint about air conditioning unlawful where employees 
had complained among themselves); Carbet Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 892, 892 (1971) (em-
ployee's complaint on behalf of himself and others concerning ventilation system consti-
tuted concerted activity); Hugh H. Wilson Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1040, 1046 (1968) 
(protest about profit-sharing distribution involved concerted activity " 'for the benefit of 
the ... group'"), enforced, 414 F.2d 1345 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1969); 
Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 618, 623-24 (1959) (three employ-
ees who complained independently about selection of foreman were engaged in pro-
tected, concerted activity), enforced, 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960). For a more complete 
discussion of this line of cases, see Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 293-99. See also 
NLRB v. Charles H. McCauley Assocs., 657 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1981). 
38. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 294; Northwestern Note, supra note 21, at 
813, 833-34. 
39. See, e.g., Tyler Business Servs., Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 567, 567 (1981) ("[A]n em-
ployee's complaint concerning working conditions of employees is protected activity."); 
Air Surrey Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1065 (1977) (finding act of individual "con-
certed," relying in part "on the likelihood that the other employees, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, shared his interest"), vacated, 601 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1979); cf. 
Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966) (stating that complaints 
seeking to enforce collective bargaining agreement "affect the rights of all employees in 
the unit, and thus constitute concerted activity"), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). 
40. 250 N.L.R.B. 614 (1980); see Northwestern Note, supra note 21, at 833 n.ll6. 
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for disputing a change in the employer's policy permitting employ-
ees to purchase gasoline at a reduced price. The employee's com-
plaints occurred in a meeting between the company controller and 
seven to twelve employees. This meeting was requested by another 
employee following an earlier meeting between management and 
employees to discuss the change. The discharged employee was 
only one of many who questioned the policy change, although his 
complaints may have been more vocal and adamant.41 In St. joseph s 
High School, 42 a lay teacher in a parochial school was terminated for 
circulating a negative report about the school and mailing the report 
to the school's accreditation committee. The employee in question 
was a former president of the lay teachers' certified union. He pre-
pared the report after discussions with other faculty members and 
with the assistance of three former teachers of the high school.43 
Reconsideration of the Alleluia doctrine was the focus of the 
Reagan Board's recent decision in Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers I).44 
Meyers I involved the termination of Kenneth Prill for contacting 
state officials about faulty brakes on his employer's truck.45 The 
Board reexamined the boundaries of section 7 and concluded that 
its protection was dependent upon "interaction among employ-
ees."46 Alleluia and its progeny were explicitly overruled.47 In its 
place, the Board articulated a four-part test for protection under 
section 7. 48 First, the activity must be "with or on the authority of 
other employees. " 49 Second, the employer must know of the con-
certed nature of the conduct. Third, the activity must be "protected 
by the Act" (i.e., the conduct must be for a legitimate objective us-
ing permissible means to accomplish that objective).5° Finally, the 
protected concerted activity must have motivated the action taken 
41. 250 N.L.R.B. at 616-18. 
42. 236 N.L.R.B. 1623 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 248 N.L.R.B. 901 (1980); see 
Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 295-96. 
43. 236 N.L.R.B. at 1624; see also Tyler Business Servs., Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 567, 567 
(1981) (discharged employee had discussed complaints with other employees as part of 
initiation of union organization drive); Diagnostic Center Hosp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 
1215, 1218 (1977) (dictum) (employees complained among themselves); Fairmont Hotel 
Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 874, 878 (1977) (other employees asked discharged employee to 
"find out" about issue in dispute); Oklahoma Allied Tel. Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 916, 918 
(1974) (employees had complained among themselves). 
44. 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985), reaff'd, 281 N.L.R.B. 118 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 
1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
45. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. 
46. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 494. 
47. Id. at 496. 
48. See id. at 497. 
49. Id. at 498. 
50. In order to be protected under section 7, employee conduct must be for the 
purpose of "mutual aid or protection." See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. 
Certain labor organization objectives are specifically prohibited by the Act, such as sec-
ondary boycotts, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982), and organizational picketing under de-
fined circumstances, id. § 158(b)(7). The means of protest also must be protected. See 
supra note 24. Sit-down strikes, see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); 
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939), and slow-downs, see NLRB 
v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965), for example, are considered unpro-
tected even in furtherance of legitimate objectives. 
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against the employee.5I 
In a strongly worded dissent, Member Zimmerman, a Carter ap-
pointee, criticized the Board majority for ignoring the dual rationale 
underlying Alleluia. The first justification was that safe working con-
ditions are a matter of inherent concern to other employees. 
Alleluia, in essence, presumed "concert" whenever an employee's 
complaint would benefit others. The second rationale, more rele-
vant to the Meyers I case, inferred "concert" where a lone em-
ployee's activity advances a legislatively declared public policy. 
Only the second rationale was necessary to protect Mr. Prill, accord-
ing to Member Zimmerman, even assuming the first rationale was an 
unwarranted extension of section 7. 52 
The Board's strict adherence to the Meyers I standards is evident 
in subsequent Board decisions. In jefferson Electric Co., 53 for exam-
ple, an employee was terminated for filing a complaint with the state 
OSHA agency about exposure to noxious fumes.54 Although sev-
eral employees complained to the employer about the fumes and 
three employees were later hospitalized, the Board found that the 
complaint was not concerted activity in the absence of group sup-
port or authorization. The Reagan Board rejected any expanded 
Alleluia concept of a volunteer spokesperson where no statutory 
right is involved. An employee retains her protected status when 
acting for a group, but more explicit authorization of that represen-
tative status now may be required. 55 
51. Meyers/, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497. The Meyers I test was adapted from a Ninth Circuit 
per curiam opinion in Pacific Electricord Co. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 
1966). 
52. Meyers/, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 499-500 (1984) (Zimmerman, dissenting). 
53. 271 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1984). 
54. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 176 (1984); Allied Erecting Co., 
270 N.L.R.B. 277 (1984). 
55. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. at 176; Allied Erecting Co., 270 
N.L.R.B. at 278; cJ. Meyers/, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497 ("In general, to find an employee's 
activity to be 'concerted,' we shall require that it be engaged in with or on the authority 
of other employees ... "). In dictum, however, the Board recently stated that specific 
authorization is not a necessary prerequisite. See Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1141-42 (1986), aff'd sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
The recent case of Salisbury Hotel, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. 
(CCH) ~ 18,705 (Apr. 21, 1987), suggests the current Board may be less rigid in apply-
ing Meyers II. The employee in Salisbury Hotel complained among her fellow employees 
and directly to management about a change in the employer's lunch-hour policy. The 
employee then called the Department of Labor about the legality of the new policy. The 
Board found the complaints to other employees protected as "calculated to induce, pre-
pare, or otherwise relate to some kind of group action." /d. at~ 18,705. These discus-
sions, the Board held, involved a "tacit" agreement that the complaint should be raised 
with management. The Board also found the call to the Department of Labor protected 
concerted activity as a logical extension of the employee's concerted complaints. /d. at~ 
18,705. 
1988] 517 
B. Judicial Reaction and the Board :S Response 
The circuit courts of appeals exhibited mixed reactions to the 
Board's earlier expansion of the concept "concerted activities." 
Some courts rejected any notion of "constructive" concerted activ-
ity, relying on the literal language of section 7 to require action by at 
least two employees.56 Other courts took a somewhat broader ap-
proach and recognized the protection of an individual who seeks to 
induce or initiate group action.57 The Interboro doctrine, protecting 
an employee who asserts a right under a collective bargaining agree-
ment, was the basis for substantial disagreement among the 
circuits. 58 
The Interboro dispute was resolved in the Board's favor in the 
Supreme Court's 1984 decision in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems.59 
But for the existence of a collective bargaining agreement, the con-
cerns of City Disposal Systems' employee were much like those of 
Kenneth Prill. James Brown worked as a truck driver transporting 
garbage to the city land fill. Mr. Brown brought his truck in for re-
pairs on the morning one of the wheels malfunctioned. The super-
visor assigned to Mr. Brown another truck. Two days earlier, this 
second truck had almost struck Mr. Brown's regularly assigned truck 
due to a problem with the brakes. Mr. Brown refused to drive the 
second truck because "something was wrong with the brakes." The 
supervisor sent Mr. Brown home, and the company fired him later 
that day.60 The collective bargaining agreement that covered Mr. 
Brown provided, "[t]he Employer shall not require employees to 
take out on the streets or highways any vehicle that is not in safe 
operating condition . . . . It shall not be a violation of the Agree-
ment where employees refuse to operate such equipment unless 
such refusal is unjustified."6 1 
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, promptly rejected a lit-
eral reading of section 7 that restricts its application to only those 
circumstances where two or more employees act together. Even the 
most literalistic of appellate courts extended section 7's protection 
to a single employee attempting to induce group activity and the 
56. See, e.g., Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1980); Jim 
Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 123 (6th Cir. 1980); Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 
F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 
1971). 
57. See, e.g., Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964). 
58. At least three circuits upheld the Board's Interboro doctrine. See, e.g., NLRB v. 
Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206-07 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. 
Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 221 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 
495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967). Four other circuits rejected the doctrine, see, e.g., NLRB v. City 
Disposal Sys., 683 F.2d 1005, 1007 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 822 (1984); Royal 
Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 372 (9th Cir. 1983); Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 
700 F.2d 687, 694 (lith Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d 
Cir. 1971), and one has expressed disapproval in dictum. NLRB v. Buddies Supermar-
kets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 717-18 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum); see also Kohls v. NLRB, 629 
F.2d 173, 176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (questioning the validity of the Interboro doctrine). 
59. 465 u.s. 822 (1984). 
60. !d. at 826-27. 
61. /d. at 824-25. 
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sole employee acting as a representative of others. Justice Brennan 
examined the two justifications used by the Board to support the 
Interboro doctrine. First, the employee's reliance on a collective bar-
gaining agreement right is an extension of the concerted activity 
that resulted in the contract. Second, "the assertion of such a right 
affects all employees covered" by the agreement.62 Justice Brennan 
apparently adopted the Board's first rationale, characterizing the as-
sertion of a contract right as an inherent part of the collective action 
that created that agreement. 63 
Justice O'Connor in dissent, joined by three other justices, argued 
that allowing a contract claim to constitute concerted activity turns 
every alleged breach into a potential unfair labor practice. This re-
sult, Justice O'Connor asserted, undermines the well-established 
principle that a violation of a collective bargaining agreement does 
not, in and of itself, constitute an unfair labor practice. Congress 
explicitly rejected a proposed NLRA provision that would have 
made contract breaches unfair labor practices. Although a collective 
bargaining agreement is enforceable in court, Justice O'Connor ex-
plained, a violation of the contract constitutes an unfair labor prac-
tice only when the breach also qualifies as an unlawful mid-term 
contract modification under section 8(d).64 
Armed with the Supreme Court's rejection of a narrow interpreta-
tion of section 7, two circuit courts questioned the Board's section 7 
analysis in Meyers I. In considering the Meyers I decision on appeal, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia con-
cluded "that the Board erred when it decided that its new definition 
of 'concerted activities' was mandated by the NLRA."65 The court 
62. /d. at 829. 
63. See id. at 831-32. 
64. /d. at 842-43 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). The enforcement of collective bargain-
ing agreements was "left to the usual processes of the law and not to the ... Board." 
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1946); see NLRB v. C & C Plywood, 385 
u.s. 421, 427-28 (1967). 
Justice O'Connor's argument misconceives the effect of the Court's ruling. She inter-
prets the result as meaning "every contract claim could be the basis for an unfair labor 
practice complaint. But the law is clear that an employer's alleged violation of a collec-
tive agreement cannot, by itself, provide the basis for an unfair labor practice com-
plaint." 465 U.S. at 842-43 (emphasis in original). Whether or not the employer 
violated the contract, however, is irrelevant to the protection provided under section 7 
by the majority. If an employee is fired for asserting a collectively bargained right, the 
Board need determine only that the employee reasonably and honestly believed she was 
asserting a contract right. The employee is protected by her reasonable and good faith 
belief even if she ultimately is proven wrong. The employee's discharge for her contrac-
tual protest is the basis of the unfair labor practice charge, not any alleged violation of 
the collective bargaining agreement. See Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 
1295, 1298-99 n.7 (1966) (merit of employee's complaint" 'is irrelevant to the question 
of whether employees are engaging in protected concerted activity.' ") (quoting Mush-
room Transp. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1150, 1158 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 330 F.2d 683 
(3d Cir. 1964)), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). 
65. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original). 
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strongly criticized the Board for ignoring and misinterpreting the 
more expansive concepts of "concerted activities" already recog-
nized in prior court and Board decisions. Although the Board could 
have been justified in reaching the same conclusion as an exercise of 
its discretion and expertise in interpreting the Act, the court noted, 
the statute did not compel such an interpretation.66 The case was 
remanded to permit the Board an opportunity to reconsider the de-
cision in light of relevant court decisions and policy implications.67 
The Second Circuit responded in a similar fashion in Ewing v. 
NLRB.68 The Second Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit that the 
Board was mistaken in its conclusion that the Meyers I rule is a re-
quired reading of section 7. This case also was remanded for the 
Board to provide a reasoned explanation of its statutory 
construction. 69 
In Meyers II the Board considered the D.C. Circuit's remand and 
reaffirmed its earlier conclusion as a "reasonable construction" of 
section 7.70 The Board distinguished City Disposal by focusing on 
the Court's emphasis on the link between the action of the individ-
ual and the group. The Board acknowledged that a single employee 
may engage in concerted activity when that link is established by 
underlying group activity; specific authorization of representation, 
the Board stated, is unnecessary.71 According to the Board, in City 
Disposal, the group link was a continuation of the ongoing concerted 
activity establishing the union-management relationship and the 
collective bargaining agreement. The Board concluded that no such 
link is evident in the assertion of a statutory right. 72 
II. Taking Another Look 
A. Statutory Analysis 
Most attempts by courts and commentators to clarify the scope of 
protection for concerted activities focus on traditional approaches 
to statutory analysis. These include reliance on the literal or "plain 
meaning" of the statutory language, examination of legislative his-
tory, and identification of underlying statutory policies that will be 
furthered by the proposed interpretation. The plain meaning ap-
proach can be dismissed without fanfare as already rejected by the 
Supreme Court in City Disposal.73 As the Court noted, "[a]lthough 
66. Id. at 954. 
67. Id. at 957. 
68. 768 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 2-3. 
69. /d. at 55-56. 
70. 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1137, 1138 (1986). 
71. /d. at 1141; see Salisbury Hotel, Inc. 283 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 1986-1987 NLRB 
Dec. (CCH) ~ 18,705 (Apr. 21, 1981);seealso supra note 55. The Board further endorsed 
the Mushroom Transportation standard protecting employees who attempt to initiate, to 
induce, or to prepare for group action. 123 L.R.R.M. at 1142; see Salisbury Hotel, Inc. 
283 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 1986-1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 18,705 (Apr. 21, 1987), dis-
cussed in supra note 55. 
72. 123 L.R.R.M. at 1142. 
73. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984). Nor has any other court 
taken a strictly literal view of the section 7 language. 
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one could interpret the phrase, 'to engage in other concerted activi-
ties,' to refer to a situation in which two or more employees are 
working together at the same time and the same place toward a 
common goal, the language of section 7 does not confine itself to 
such a narrow meaning."74 Section 7 is of pivotal significance in 
protecting the American worker. A constrained definitional analysis 
of section 7 seems no more appropriate than an attempt to deter-
mine the literal meaning of "to discriminate" in section 703(b) of 
Title VII. 75 
Several commentators offer extensive analyses of section 7's legis-
lative history in efforts to ferret out the true intent of the "concerted 
activities" language.76 This critical terminology was taken from an 
equivalent provision in the NLRA's predecessor, the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act. 77 The National Industrial Recovery Act, in 
tum, adopted the language from the Norris-LaGuardia Act, passed 
in 1932 to prohibit federal court injunctions in "labor disputes."78 
From this historical perspective, commentators argue that section 7 
never was intended to eliminate protection of the single employee. 
Rather, the protection of group activity was in addition to the im-
plicit individual protection inherent in the concept of industrial 
democracy. 79 
Commentators thus make a strong argument, based on legislative 
history, that section 7 was not designed to foreclose the protection of 
some types of individual activity. Assuming that much is clear, how-
ever, the legislative history cannot fairly be interpreted to establish 
the intent of individual protection. The Board and the courts might 
inquire justifiably into why Congress did not explicitly include such 
protection if it were intended. Although commentators attempt to 
respond to this problem, the legislative history ultimately is unlikely 
to convince the courts of the "correctness" of individual protection. 
The wholesale adoption of the language from other sources might 
suggest that little thought was given to the precise boundaries of 
74. /d. 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982). 
76. See, e.g., Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 331 (finding that the history of the 
NLRA suggests that it was intended to encompass the individual's right to complain and 
to act on his own behalf); Lynd, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recogni-
tion: A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. LJ. 720, 725 (1975) (arguing that the NLRA 
was intended by Congress to protect as "concerted" employment-related activities 
whether undertaken by one person or many). 
77. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 198 (1933) (held 
unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). 
78. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982)). For a thorough review of the relevant legislative history, see 
Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 331-46. 
79. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 338-46; Lynd, supra note 76, at 727-34; 
Note, Individual Rights for Organized and Unorganized Employees Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 58 TEX. L. REV. 991, 1006-08 (1980). 
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section 7, one way or the other. At best, such analyses leave the 
issue an open question. 
Perhaps the most popular arena of debate in defining the extent 
of "concerted activities" is an examination of the Act's underlying 
policies. The problem with such an approach, however, is that it 
depends significantly on the definition and emphasis given to the 
particular policies identified. The subjective element involved leads 
inevitably to manipulation of the desired result. In arguing for a 
reading of section 7 that would include individual protection, for 
example, Professors Gorman and Finkin focus on industrial democ-
racy as an important goal of the NLRA and its antecedents. At the 
heart of this right of group protest, they assert, is the right of indi-
vidual protest.80 Another commentator describes the "central pur-
pose" of section 7 as encouraging and protecting employee activity; 
refusal to protect an individual inherently discourages other em-
ployees when common concerns are involved.81 
Yet another commentator criticizes the Interboro doctrine as un-
dermining the principle of exclusive representation. This argument 
reasons that, in the union context, individual employee complaints 
circumvent the bargaining representative and thus reduce the power 
of that representative and derogate the grievance and arbitration 
process.82 Other commentators highlight "collective" action and 
equalization of bargaining power as the Act's central themes. Pro-
tecting individual complaints, it is argued, dilutes the Act and runs 
contrary to these basic concems.83 
Each of these policies, and undoubtedly others, have a place in 
NLRA statutory interpretation. But to pick and choose which policy 
is applicable to the problem at hand ultimately seems unsatisfactory. 
The selection of other policies, or even differing definitions of the 
same policy, leads too readily to inconsistent results. Equalization 
of bargaining power and minimization of industrial strife, for exam-
ple, are policy goals explicitly referenced in the Act's preamble.84 
Some commentators use these goals to reject the type of individual 
protection at issue here. 85 When an entire work force joins together 
to protest working conditions, their bargaining power undoubtedly 
is enhanced. Employee dissatisfaction resulting in a strike or other 
kinds of industrial strife likely will be reduced by the right to de-
mand negotiations with the employer. Yet these same advantages, 
80. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 338-46. See generally Summers, Industrial De-
mocracy, supra note 12, at 29-34. 
81. Northwestern Note, supra note 21, at 836. 
82. See Note, Individual Employee Rights Versus the Rights of Employees as a Group: NLRB 
v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 27 B.C.L. REV. 453,470-78 (1986); cf. Note, Alleluia, The 
Buck Stops Here: The Parameters of Individual Protected Concerted Activity Under the National 
Labor Relations Act, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 347, 374 (1985). 
83. See Bethel, Constructive Concerted Activity Under the NLRA: Conflicting Signals from the 
Court and the Board, 59 IND. LJ. 583, 601-03 (1984); Note, The Requirement of 'Concerted' 
Action Under the NLRA, 53 CoLuM. L. REv. 514, 529 (1953); Note, Protection of Individual 
Action As "Concerted Activity" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CoRNELL L. REv. 
369, 389-92 (1983). 
84. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). 
85. See supra note 83. 
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albeit to a lesser degree, are just as likely to result from protection 
of the individual voice. The bargaining power of a single employee 
is increased with the protected right to communicate concerns and 
complaints. Rejecting that right could lead to further employee 
frustration, resulting in some level of "strife" in the workplace. 
The examination of underlying policies is a useful tool of statu-
tory analysis but offers only limited insight in resolving the funda-
mental question concerning the scope of section 7. No single policy 
underlies all of the Act's various provisions. Determining the ap-
propriate interpretation of section 7 by policy analysis requires 
agreement on (1) what policies constitute bases for the Act, 
(2) which of those policies are relevant in an analysis of section 7, 
(3) how the relevant policies are defined in this context, and (4) how 
those policies will be furthered or hindered by competing statutory 
interpretations. With so many opportunities for debate, it is not 
surprising that such disparate results can be reached using the same 
analytical approach. 
B. Structural Analysis 
This Article proposes that section 7 be reexamined in light of the 
structure of the NLRA. Instead of a collection of substantive rights, 
the Act, from this perspective, creates a process by which employees 
and employers communicate with each other - a labor-
management dialogue supported, encouraged, and protected by the 
NLRA's structure. The results of that dialogue, however, generally 
are left to the parties; the Act does not guarantee successful resolu-
tion. This concept of communication provides the common thread 
that links the Act's substantive provisions, as well as the important 
underlying policies identified by various commentators.86 
Focusing on the Act's structure avoids much of the multi-level 
and manipulative debate of identifying, interpreting, and applying 
competing policies. Instead of starting with the value-loaded ques-
tion of what should be protected to promote the NLRA's policies, 
one begins with the more neutral question of how employee rights 
(whatever they may be) are protected under the Act's scheme. 
Agreement on the nature of that process narrows the issue of con-
tention to one of degree. If communication is the procedural key to 
the NLRA, the communication right of a single employee is compat-
ible with that structure almost by definition. The debate then is lim-
ited to evaluating the relative benefits and burdens of extending the 
86. Cj Summers, Industrial Democracy, supra note 12, at 34 ("[T]he primary purpose 
[of the NLRA] was to give employees an effective voice, through collective bargaining, in 
determining the terms and conditions of their employment."). 
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commu~ication process on a continuum from group to individual 
expressiOn. 
The crafting of and restrictions on employee and employer rights 
and obligations under the NLRA illustrate the dialogue theme. The 
right of employees to communicate with each other is protected ex-
plicitly by the section 7 rights "to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations. "87 During non-working time, employees 
have a presumptive right to discuss such matters and solicit support 
from fellow employees.88 Subject to the Board's procedural re-
quirements, employees may voice their desire for union representa-
tion through a secret-ballot election.8 9 
When representative status is achieved, unions and employers 
have a duty to bargain under the Act, yet neither party is required to 
agree to any proposal.90 As the Supreme Court stated shortly after 
the enactment of the NLRA, "[t]he theory of the Act is that free 
opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of em-
ployees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about 
the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not at-
tempt to compel."91 The duty to bargain is reinforced by prohibit-
ing the employer from changing any term or condition of 
employment without first bargaining to an impasse.92 Similarly, a 
collective bargaining agreement cannot be terminated or modified 
without a sixty-day notice period "to meet and confer."93 
The Act also requires as a condition of contract termination or 
modification that the party notify the Federal Mediation and Concil-
iation Service (the Service).94 The Service, an agency independent 
of the Board, was created to assist in the communication process of 
negotiations.95 Consistent with limitations of the NLRA, however, 
the Service has no power to compel settlement or agreement.96 
The protection of comn'mnication processes is further reflected in 
the substantial protection and deference afforded griev-
ance/arbitration procedures. The Supreme Court recognizes the 
promotion and enforcement of these procedures as a high priority 
87. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (1982). 
88. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797 (1945). 
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982); NLRB Statements of Procedures, 29 C.F.R. 
§§ 101.17-.21 (1987). 
90. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1982); see H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 
104 (1970); see also NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, 45 (1937) ("The 
Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does not com-
pel any agreement whatever."). Section 8(d) of the Act, added in 1947, explicitly states 
that the duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession." 29 U.S.C. § I 58( d) (1982). 
91. jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 45. 
92. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405,409 (1964); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 
736, 744 (1962). 
93. 29 u.s.c. § 158(d) (1982). 
94. /d. 
95. See id. § 171 (a) ("It is the policy of the United States that ... the best interest of 
employers and employees can most satisfactorily be secured by the settlement of issues 
between employers and employees through the processes of conference and collective 
bargaining between employers and the representatives of their employees."). 
96. See id. § 203. 
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of national labor policy.97 Any doubt as to whether an arbitration 
provision covers the dispute in question is resolved in favor of arbi-
trability. 98 Once an arbitration award is rendered, a court must en-
force the award unless the arbitrator exceeded her authority under 
the contract. In only the most unusual case will an arbitration award 
be overturned. 99 The policies of the Act, as interpreted by the 
Court, again operate to provide maximum protection to the com-
munication process while not in any way assuring a satisfactory or 
"correct" result. 
The Supreme Court's enthusiasm for the arbitration process is 
highlighted by Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, Ioo a 
remarkable exercise in judicial legislation. The Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, enacted in 1932, prohibits federal courts from issuing injunc-
tions "in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute."101 
The Court had consistently read the Norris-LaGuardia restrictions 
broadly to limit federal court interference in labor-management re-
lations.102 In 1962, the Court included within these restrictions a 
federal court injunction against a strike in violation of a contractual 
no-strike clause. 103 The Supreme Court changed its mind eight 
years later in Boys Markets. In light of the importance of arbitration 
to national labor policy, the Court created a judicial exception to the 
"literal" language of Norris-LaGuardia. An injunction is now avail-
able whenever the employees are striking, in violation of a no-strike 
clause, over a dispute subject to a binding arbitration procedure in 
97. See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455-56 (1957) (holding 
that arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements may be enforced by fed-
eral courts because to decide otherwise "would undercut the Act and defeat its policy"). 
98. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 
(1960). 
99. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764-66 (1983) (a "fed-
eral court may not second-guess" an arbitrator's decision); United Steelworkers v. En-
terprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-99 (1960) (as long as an award "draws its 
essence from the collective bargaining agreement" courts may not overrule an arbitrator 
simply because they disagree with his decision). See generally Aaron, judicial Intervention in 
Labor Arbitration, 20 STAN. L. REv. 41 (1967) (discussing the limited role of judicial review 
in enforcing arbitration awards); St. Antoine, judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A 
Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1137 (1977) (reviewing 
decisional law and concluding that courts generally should enforce arbitration awards 
unless the award is procedurally defective or illegal). 
100. 398 u.s. 235 (1970). 
101. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70, 70-71 (1932) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982)). 
102. See, e.g., Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's 
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 709 (1982) (stating that because the term "any labor disputes" is to 
be read broadly, a court may not enjoin a work stoppage even though it is politically 
motivated); Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 371 (1960) 
(finding that the term "labor dispute" includes picketing of a foreign vessel by American 
seamen, and therefore such activity may not be enjoined). 
103. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 200 (1962). 
1988] 525 
the collective bargaining agreement. 104 Indeed, even in the absence 
of a no-strike clause, one can be implied in appropriate circum-
stances based on the arbitration provision alone. 105 The Court thus 
is willing to venture far beyond the "four comers" of the labor laws 
to protect the parties' right to be heard. 
Not all substantive provisions of the Act fit neatly into this pro-
posed perspective. The point of focusing on the structure of the 
NLRA, however, is to look beyond the precise statutory language to 
the symmetry of the whole. From that viewpoint, the Act creates a 
process through which employee and employer communications are 
both protected and, in some respects, mandated. 
The communication thread that connects the NLRA's explicit and 
implied substantive provisions is equally evident in the Act's under-
lying policies identified by courts and commentators. Principles of 
industrial democracy, equalization of bargaining p9wer, dispute res-
olution through arbitration procedures, minimization of industrial 
strife, and the right of association are all grounded in the right of 
communication as the means chosen by Congress to protect these 
interests. The dialogue component is obvious in such principles as 
industrial democracy, encouragement of arbitration, and the right of 
association. The connection might be somewhat less apparent when 
discussing equalization of bargaining power and minimization of in-
dustrial strife. Although a variety of methods could have been se-
lected to accomplish these goals, the one selected was the right of 
communication. Employees are free to discuss their concerns and 
organize as a group without fear of reprisal. Employees also can 
force an employer to talk (i.e., negotiate) with their chosen repre-
sentative. The employer, on the other hand, lawfully may refuse to 
resolve any or all employee concerns. 
C. Protecting Individual Communication 
Students of the NLRA might be willing to concede that communi-
cation is the rationale or at least one of the rationales behind the 
Act's structural approach to employee/employer relations. Many 
might respond, nonetheless, that the NLRA protects only group or 
concerted communication, rather than individual communication. 
This Article next proposes that individual protection should be in-
cluded within this scheme. 
Understanding what is being protected is important to a discus-
sion of why the individual deserves protection under the Act. Indi-
vidual employee complaints generally fall into two broad categories: 
complaints or claims to outside governmental agencies (e.g., OSHA, 
worker's compensation) and complaints made directly to the em-
104. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253 
(1970). 
105. See Locall74, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1962). A Boys 
Markets injunction may then be issued by the court based on the implied no-strike obli-
gation which must be "coterminous" with the arbitration clause. Gateway Coal Co. v. 
United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974). 
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ployer. Employees sometimes may have a choice. Unsafe working 
conditions could be reported to the supervisor, to OSHA, or to 
both. Worker's compensation is available, however, only by filing a 
claim with the state. Conversely, a complaint of excessive overtime 
can be resolved only by the employer, assuming no wage and hour 
laws are at issue. Perhaps employers are more likely to discharge an 
employee for an "outside" complaint because of the expense that 
may result from an agency investigation and the employer's anger at 
the "disloyalty" of the whistleblower. 106 Employees are terminated, 
nonetheless, for internal complaints as well.I07 
One could argue that protecting complaints to governmental 
agencies simply is an unnecessary extension of the Act. Many em-
ployees who file agency claims already are protected by retaliation 
provisions in the relevant legislation. OSHA, for example, specifi-
cally prohibits an employer from discriminating against an em-
ployee for filing a complaint or instituting any related 
proceeding.108 Not all comparable legislation, however, contains 
this protection. Furthermore, if only agency complaints are pro-
tected, a savvy employee will have no incentive to discuss her con-
cern directly with the employer first. Employers undoubtedly would 
prefer an opportunity to address the problem before the govern-
ment is brought in, yet the current system of haphazard protection 
encourages just the opposite. From the employee's perspective, 
communication with the employer similarly might seem a more logi-
cal first step. 
In other instances, the employee will have no choice but to go 
directly to her employer. To protect the lone employee's communi-
cation right in these circumstances does not guarantee that her 
wages will be increased, her work station will be changed, her truck 
will be repaired, or the heat will be turned up. Two employees have 
a protected right to raise such concerns without fear of retaliation 
for making the complaint. A single employee should be given that same 
protection under section 7 when protesting terms or conditions of 
employment. This protection could be achieved by at least two dif-
ferent approaches. 109 Under one alternative, the complaining indi-
vidual would be protected by a rebuttable presumption of concerted 
106. The discharges of Robert Ewing and Kenneth Prill are good examples of termi-
nations for complaints to governmental agencies. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying 
text. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41; Sullair P.T.O., Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 614, 
615-18 (1980); Ontario Knife Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1292-95, enforcement denied, 637 
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980); Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1350-51 (1978). 
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982). Applicable regulations also indicate that the 
provision is violated if an employee is discharged for complaining directly to the em-
ployer. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.9(c) (1987). 
109. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text. 
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activity. The second approach would make that presumption ir-
rebuttable. Whether a complaint is made by one or by a group of a 
hundred employees, however, the employer lawfully may choose to 
ignore or deny the request. The employee or employees only have 
the right to protest. Consistent with the Act's approach to collective 
bargaining, no results would be required. And as with complaints 
by two employees, the protection is lost if the manner of com-
plaining becomes disruptive.IIO 
1. The Statutory Language 
In spite of this focus on the communicative structure of the Act, 
many undoubtedly will object to the expanded protection proposed 
as being contrary to the statute's explicit limitation to "concerted 
activities." Although, as critics might argue, the Supreme Court re-
jected a literal reading of section 7, the Court did not authorize an 
interpretation that effectively deletes the word "concerted" alto-
gether. However, this narrow focus on one word is misguided and 
inconsistent with the treatment of section 7 in other circumstances. 
The Act protects "other concerted activities for ... mutual aid or 
protection." 111 This concept should be taken as a whole, not dis-
sected into pieces for microscopic examination. The courts and the 
Board have wasted little time analyzing whether "mutual aid" means 
something separate and distinct from "mutual protection." If "aid" 
and "protection" are given the same meaning, why were both words 
included? If their meaning is different, why are the terms so often 
treated as a single unit? 
The courts have given the "mutual aid or protection" language 
the most expansive possible interpretation, described by one com-
mentator as including "almost any activity that somehow affects the 
well-being of the employees as a group." 112 In Eastex, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 113 the Supreme Court concluded that section 7 protects the 
distribution of a union newsletter which, among other things, criti-
cized a presidential veto of a federal minimum wage increase and 
urged employees to register to vote. The Court rejected the em-
ployer's contention that "mutual aid or protection" should be re-
stricted to actions affecting the immediate employee/employer 
relationship. Although the employees were paid more than the ve-
toed wage, the Court recognized a potential indirect impact on the 
company employees and employees generally. 114 In equally attenu-
ated circumstances, the Board has held that section 7 protected a 
group of engineers who wrote to legislators opposing changes in 
immigration laws that might have increased the immigration of 
foreign-educated engineers. 115 The Board's narrow approach to 
I 10. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
Ill. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). 
112. Note, Constructive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern Metal-
Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 152, 161 (1972). 
113. 437 u.s. 556 (1978). 
114. See id. at 565-67. 
115. See Kaiser Eng'rs, 213 N.L.R.B. 752 (1974), enforced, 528 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 
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the "concerted activities" language in section 7 stands in stark con-
trast to the Court's and the Board's broad interpretation of the 
"mutual aid or protection" phrase that follows. 
The literal language of section 7 also has not proven to be an 
impediment in limiting the S!=Ope of the provision. Courts have 
shown no reluctance to add to section 7 restrictions that cannot be 
derived from a literal reading of the statute. By its terms section 7 
protects all "concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection," 
yet the courts and the Board routinely deny that protection if the 
activities are disloyal or disruptive in some way.116 Similarly, noth-
ing in section 7 limits the employee's right to organize. The 
Supreme Court requires, however, that this right be balanced 
against employer property rights. 117 To expand the language of 
section 7 to include individual complaints of common concerns is 
no more unfaithful to the statutory language than these implied 
limitations. 
The NLRA holds a special place in our legal system as the first 
and only comprehensive federal labor legislation for most American 
workers. 118 Although other statutes establish requirements for se-
lected employment conditions, 119 only the NLRA purports to ad-
dress all terms and conditions of employment. And only the NLRA 
addresses employment terms by allowing employees themselves to 
have a voice in what those terms should be, as opposed to exter-
nally-imposed governmental determinations. For the employee, the 
Act functions like a worker's bill of rights and should be construed 
accordingly. 
The NLRA represents a dynamic conception of the working rela-
tionship capable of growing with our evolving understanding of the 
workplace and employee needs. Although the Act's framers might 
not have fully considered the extent of individual protection in the 
1976); see also Altex Ready Mixed Concrete Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 696 (1976), enforced, 542 
F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976); Socony Mobil Oil Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1965), enforced, 357 
F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1966); Walls Mfg. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1962), enforced, 321 F.2d 
753 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963). 
116. See supra note 24. 
117. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 
351 u.s. 105, 107 (1956). 
118. Railway and transportation employees, of course, were covered since 1926 
under the Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 
U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982)). The NLRA also does not extend coverage, for example, to 
governmental employees, agricultural employees, domestic service employees, and su-
pervisors. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3) (1982). 
119. Examples of other labor legislation that impose mandatory employment terms 
include the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982) (minimum wage, 
overtime compensation); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 
(1982) (safety standards); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) (discrimina-
tion); Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982) (sex discrimination in wages); and state 
workers compensation laws. 
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statutory scheme, the communication structure created is both com-
patible with the protection proposed and necessary to adjust that 
structure to employee-management relations fifty years later. The 
continued viability of the Act is dependent upon the Board's willing-
ness to mold the legislation to the demands of labor relations in the 
1980s and 1990s. In the words of the Supreme Court, the Board 
must accept its "responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns 
of industriallife."I2o 
The framers of other statutes undoubtedly would be surprised to 
learn of their evolution and expansion. The enforcement of Title 
VII in the 1970s and 1980s required recognition of more subtle 
forms of discrimination in sexual harassment121 and the disparate 
impact of neutral employment practices. 122 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court relies on the fundamental purpose of Title VII to justify rul-
ings that the language itself literally prohibits. Pursuant to appro-
priate affirmative action plans, employers are permitted to consider 
an individual's race or sex in making employment decisions. 123 Sim-
ilarly, section 1983 developed a life of its own exceeding its propo-
nents' expectations. 124 The maturing of the NLRA, as proposed, 
presents a far less dramatic extension. 
2. Benefits and Burdens 
Why should the individual be accorded the same protection as a 
"concerted" group of two or more persons? The interests of both 
workers and management suggest there is much to be lost and little 
to be gained by denying this protection. The employee loses a fun-
damental right of speech - the right to voice her complaints with-
out risking discipline or discharge. The loss of that right is based on 
the often fortuitous fact that the employee went to the employer 
120. NLRB v.J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975); see NLRB v. City Dispo-
sal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 839-40 (1984) (noting "importance of 'the Board's special 
function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial 
life'" (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963))); cf. First Nat'l 
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 (1981) ("Congress deliberately left the 
words 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment' [Section 8(d)] 
without further definition, for it did not intend to deprive the Board of the power further 
to define those terms in light of specific industrial practices."). Having evaded this re-
sponsibility, the Board's current interpretation of section 7 therefore is not entitled to 
the deference usually accorded the Board's statutory construction. See Weingarten, 420 
U.S. at 266-67; American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965); Erie Resis-
tor, 373 U.S. at 235-36; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 196-97 (1941). 
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court often discusses the deference due the Board's 
expertise only when the Court agrees with the Board's conclusion. Compare First Nat'l 
Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (containing no reference to judicial deference) 
with Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495-98 (1979) (discussing at length the 
"considerable deference" due the Board). 
121. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
122. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-32 (1971). 
123. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1460 
(1987) ("[Section] 703 [of Title VII] has been interpreted ... to permit what its lan-
guage read literally would prohibit.") (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
124. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (municipalities liable 
under section 1983 without qualifying immunities); Nichol, Federalism, State Courts, and 
Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REv. 959 (1987). 
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alone without the aid of a friend. Had the employee understood the 
ramifications of that fact, she certainly would have taken a co-worker 
with her or convinced the co-worker to allow her to speak as their 
joint representative. Surely we cannot expect an employee to know 
the legal significance of her actions in this respect, at least not until 
it is too late. 
As other commentators have discussed persuasively, the Act's 
protection should not depend on chance.125 The fortuity of refus-
ing section 7 coverage to the lone employee while protecting that 
employee if she happens to bring a friend is a largely irrational dis-
tinction from the employee's perspective. The appearance of un-
fairness in the administration of the Act is almost ovenvhelming. 
Although protection of one employee may do little to promote the 
type of collective bargaining power referenced in section 1 of the 
Act, neither does the traditional protection afforded two employees 
in identical circumstances. 
From the employer's perspective, the protection of such a funda-
mental employee right involves minimal cost. Again, the employer 
need not satisfy the employee's request. The employer could not 
lawfully discipline or discharge two employees making the same re-
quest jointly. To permit a sole employee to raise the same com-
plaint adds only a nominal burden on management's prerogatives. 
Undoubtedly many employers, already cautious due to the recent 
rise in wrongful discharge actions, 126 would consider such protec-
tion no practical burden at all in conjunction with policies already in 
place requiring "for cause" terminations. 
Protecting the voice of the individual in fact may provide some 
significant advantages for the employer. A number of studies 
demonstrate that employee turnover is lower in unionized 
workforces than in unorganized facilities. Employee resignations, 
according to one study by Professors Freeman and Medoff, 127 are 
reduced from 31 to 65 percent when employees are organized, and 
unionization increases employee tenure between 23 and 32 per-
cent.128 When Professors Freeman and Medoff attempted to isolate 
the cause of this phenomenon, they concluded that the "voice" pro-
vided to employees through union representation constituted the 
125. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 329, 344-46; Note, The Requirement of 
"Concerted" Action Under the NLRA, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 514, 517 (1953). But see Bethel, 
Constructive Concerted Activity Under the NLRA: Conflicting Signals from the Court and the Board, 
59 IND. LJ. 583, 603-04 (1984). 
126. See, e.g., The Employment-At-Will issue: A BNA Special Report, 2 NEws AND BACK-
GROUND INFORMATION, LABOR RELATIONS REPORTER (BNA) No. 23, 11 (Nov. 22, 1982); 
Note, Wrongful Termination of Employee at Will: The California Trend, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 259, 
260-61 (1983); Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REv. 153, 
153-61 (1981). 
127. R. FREEMAN AND]. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 94-107 (1984). 
128. /d. at 108. 
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dominant influence. Employees were less inclined to quit their jobs 
in a unionized shop because of their enhanced ability to communi-
cate with the employer. 129 Although the effect of protecting em-
ployee complaints is unlikely to be as dramatic, this evidence 
suggests there actually may be cost savings for the employer in re-
duced turnover. 
Protection of the employee voice also can benefit employers hop-
ing to defeat any future efforts of union organization. A study by 
the National Industrial Conference Board concluded that the more 
employee "voice" permitted, the more likely a company is to win a 
union election. Employers with no complaint policy won only 44 
percent of their elections, while companies with an "open door" 
policy won 51 percent of the time. Employers with formal grievance 
appeals procedures fared even better, winning 79 percent of their 
union elections.130 The same study further reported that 63 percent 
of employers who defeated union organization immediately intro-
duced new complaint policies or procedures. 131 Such behavior im-
plies that the absence of an employee right to voice dissatisfaction is 
perceived by employers themselves as an important factor in 
prompting union organization. When the employer already is pro-
viding a communication channel for employee concerns, the need 
for and likelihood of union organization evidently are diminished 
significantly. 
Protecting the individual offers practical advantages as well in the 
NLRA's administration. The Board's current approach creates an 
anomaly between the legality of threats of discharge and the dis-
charge itself. In Certified Service, Inc., 132 the Board found an em-
ployer in violation of section 8(a)(l) for threatening retaliation 
against employees for filing an OSHA complaint. Following an 
OSHA inspection that resulted in the company being fined, a super-
visor shouted to a group of employees that when he discovered who 
reported to OSHA, "they was gone." When the employer identified 
and fired the culprit, however, the Board declined to find the em-
ployee's complaint protected concerted activity. 133 If the threat it-
self is unlawful, "making good" on the illegal threat should be 
equally improper.I34 
Individual protection also offers an opportunity for clear 
129. /d. at 108-09. 
130. /d. 
131. /d. Cj. R. LEWIS & W. KRUPMAN, WINNING N.L.R.B. ELEcnONS: MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 17 (2d ed. 1979) ("A major cause of unsatisfactory 
employee relations is poor communications or no communications at all. It is a truism 
in human relations, whether at home or at work, that communicating can avoid misun-
derstanding. But, communicating is a two-way process. It requires listening, as well as 
speaking."). 
132. 270 N.L.R.B. 360 (1984). 
133. /d. at 360. 
134. See Ewing v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[I]t is somewhat mystifying 
that the Board should find that an employer's threat to a group of its employees that it 
would discharge those responsible for filing a safety complaint is a violation of section 
8(a)(l), and yet not find the actual discharge of an employee who filed the complaint to 
be such a violation."). 
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guidelines to govern both employer and employee behavior. An 
employee could not be terminated lawfully for work-related inquir-
ies unless the means used were unprotected under long-standing 
Board criteria. The Board would have no need to consider or pon-
der the indistinct line between individual action and group authori-
zation of a representative. The employer's knowledge of the 
concerted nature of the action would no longer be a necessary re-
quirement, 135 although it would remain important in cases where 
the reason for discharge is disputed. Thus, when an employer 
claims the employee was fired for poor performance and the em-
ployee claims retaliation for complaints, the employer's knowledge 
of the complaint is a very relevant concern. In most cases, however, 
the employee admittedly was discharged for the complaint, but 
whether the company was aware that the employee was acting as a 
spokesman for others is unclear.I36 
The knowledge requirement for a finding of concerted activity is 
particularly unsatisfactory. The prerequisite of employer knowl-
edge seems inconsistent with the well-established principle, in the 
context of other section 8(a)(l) violations, that employer motive is 
usually irrelevant.137 The Board's concern rests solely on whether 
the employer conduct had a tendency to interfere with employee 
section 7 rights, that is, what was the effect of the employer's ac-
tion?138 As some commentators note, the discharge of an employee 
for voicing her work-related complaint predictably will discourage 
other employees from engaging in similar conduct. The discharge 
thus "restrains" employees within the meaning of section 8(a)(l). 139 
More significantly, the knowledge requirement unfairly places the 
risk of a mistake on the party who will be injured the most. Assume 
135. See Air Surrey Corp. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 252, 257 (6th Cir. 1979); Meyers/, 268 
N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984). 
136. See Air Surrey Corp., 601 F.2d at 257. 
137. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 351-53; Note, Discharge for Griping as an 
Unfair Labor Practice, 62 YALE LJ. 1263, 1269-70 (1953). 
138. See Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965) ("[A] vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(1) alone ... presupposes an act which is unlawful even absent a 
discriminatory motive."); NLRB v. Bumup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964); Ameri-
can Freightways Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1959) ("[I]nterference, restraint, and coer-
cion under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not tum on the employer's motive or on 
whether the coercion succeeded or failed. The test is whether the employer engaged in 
conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of 
employee rights under the Act."). See generally Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in 
the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE 
LJ. 1269 (1968) (arguing that the treatment of motive as a critical factor in certain un-
fair labor practices disguises the thrust of the Act's prohibitions and hampers its 
administration). 
139. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 21, at 352-53; cJ. Ewing v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 51, 
55 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Group support [for an individual filing a safety complaint] may ra-
tionally be assumed, absent evidence to the contrary, because fellow employees presum-
ably want to be free to assert such a right without fear of losing their jobs."). 
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a single employee approaches her supervisor to question the exces-
sive overtime the employees are required to work. The employee is 
fired on the spot for "meddling." Even if the employee was for-
mally designated a group spokesman by other employees, the dis-
charge may be lawful if the employee failed to advise her supervisor 
of this fact. A statement by the employee that, "[w]e were wonder-
ing when the overtime would slow down," might not be sufficient 
notice. Because the Board requires actual, not inferred knowl-
edge, 140 such an ambiguous statement would not necessarily notify 
the employer of the concerted nature of the complaint. Acting as an 
authorized spokesman, therefore, might not be enough to afford 
section 7 protection. The employee must be certain the employer 
knows of her spokesman status. 
The knowledge requirement reinforces the notion that an em-
ployee will be protected or unprotected under section 7 by sheer 
chance because the employee is unlikely to be aware of the Board's 
interpretation of the Act's limitations. The employer risks little in 
the confrontation because the discharge will be upheld as long as 
the employee failed to obtain group authorization or the supervisor 
can claim lack of actual knowledge of the concerted component of 
the action. If the employer suspects the employee's complaint is 
concerted, she has two options. She can terminate the employee 
anyway, hoping to defend the discharge by proving that the em-
ployee was not a designated spokesman or that her suspicions did 
not constitute actual knowledge. In either case, the employee re-
mains unemployed. The employer's second option is not to take the 
risk and simply order the employee back to work. Exercising this 
latter option, the employer loses the satisfaction of firing someone 
who complained. The employee remains employed. 
3. Delineating the Scope of Protection 
To achieve the proposed level of protection, at least two ap-
proaches are possible. The first, more limited approach, establishes 
a rebuttable presumption of concerted interest in any employee 
complaint regarding working con9.itions. Discharge of the single 
employee would be upheld only when the employer could overcome 
that presumption with evidence that no other employee shared the 
terminated employee's concerns. The second, more expansive ap-
proach, protects the sole complaining employee whenever terms or 
conditions of employment are the subject of the complaint. The in-
dividual complainer would enjoy an irrebuttable presumption of 
protection to the same extent that two employees making a joint 
complaint would be protected. Both approaches require a more ex-
pansive reading of section 7 than even that adopted by the pre-
Reagan Boards. 141 The advantages and disadvantages of each alter-
native are discussed in turn. 
140. See Walter Brucker & Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1307 (1984). 
141. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. 
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The rebuttable presumption approach is more palatable to those 
who continue to focus on the use of "concerted" in section 7. A 
presumption of shared employee interest retains more faithfulness 
to the literal language of the statute even though much diluted from 
the Board's current analysis. Group or concerted concern remains 
the centerpiece of section 7 protection. The burden of proof is 
shifted, however, to the party who is harmed less by the choice be-
tween the right to terminate and the right to complain - the 
employer. 
Presumptions are common devices utilized in other areas of the 
Act's enforcement, perhaps with even less justification than the pre-
sumption proposed here. Once a union achieves representative sta-
tus, for example, the Board presumes that majority support for the 
union continues regardless of turnover in the workforce. Indeed, 
the entire bargaining unit may be replaced without altering or af-
fecting this presumption of continued majority status. 142 The pre-
sumption is irrebuttable during the year following certification 143 
and during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. 144 After 
the certification year, the employer may withdraw recognition only if 
she sustains the burden of proving either that the union did not 
have majority support when recognition was withdrawn, or that the 
withdrawal was based upon a reasonable, objective, good-faith 
doubt as to the union's continued majority status. 145 
Continuing majority status similarly is presumed when a new em-
ployer purchases an on-going business and hires enough of her 
142. See Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070, 1070 (1977) (ab-
sent special circumstances "new employees ... are presumed to support the union in 
the same ratio as those whom they have replaced"), a.IJ'd, 577 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482, 1484 (1965), enforcement denied, 359 F.2d 799 (7th 
Cir. 1966); see also Eastern Wash. Distrib. Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 1149, 1152-53 (1975); 
Harpeth Steel, Inc., 208 N.L.R.B. 545, 547 (1974). Until recently, the presumption of 
continuing union support extended even to permanent replacements for striking em-
ployees. See Pennco, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716, enforced, 684 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982); Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070, 
1070 (1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1978). The Board abandoned that presump-
tion in the 1987 case of Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 113, 1986-1987 
NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 18,828 (July 27, 1987). 
143. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954). Recognition required by a Board 
bargaining order also is accorded a one year mandatory period of bargaining. See Mar-
Jac Poultry Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 785, 786 (1962). When an employer voluntarily recog-
nizes a union, as opposed to recognition following a Board-conducted election, the pre-
sumption of majority status is irrebuttable for a "reasonable" period of time. NLRB v. 
Sierra Dev. Co., 604 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 1979), enforcing, 231 N.L.R.B. 22 (1977); 
NLRB v. Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., 474 F.2d 1380, 1383 (2d Cir. 1973); Capitol 
Temptrol Corp., 243 N.L.R.B. 575, 586 (1979). 
144. See Precision Striping, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 169, 169 (1979), enforcement denied, 642 
F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981); United States Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652, 655 (1966). 
145. NLRB v. Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 577 F.2d 805, 811 (2d Cir. 
1978), enforcing, 230 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1977); NLRB v. Dayton Motels, Inc., 474 F.2d 328, 
332 (6th Cir. 1973); Harpeth Steel, Inc., 208 N.L.R.B. 545, 545 (1974). 
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predecessor's represented employees to constitute a majority of the 
new employer's workforce. 146 Thus, if the new employer, called a 
"successor," hires at least fifty-one former employees of the busi-
ness for a unit of 100 employees, the Board assumes that all fifty-
one employees support the union and desire continued representa-
tion. The successor employer will be ordered to recognize and bar-
gain with the union recognized by the predecessor employer. 
Presumptions of continued union majority support are justified as 
necessary for industrial relations stability. 147 A presumption of con-
certed interest in a single employee's complaint about working con-
ditions is required to protect the fundamental integrity of the 
NLRA's structural reliance on employee/employer communication. 
In many cases the concerted interest presumption is more likely to 
reflect reality than the presumption of continuing majority union 
support. Although the latter presumption may be necessary for the 
effective operation of the Act, there is little reason to assume the 
presumption mirrors the actual sentiments of newly hired employ-
ees. A presumption of concerted interest, however, often will come 
much closer to the truth. In jefferson Electric, 148 for example, the ter-
minated employee was only one of several who were treated for ex-
posure to noxious fumes. More significantly, other employees 
individually complained to the employer about the fumes. The ter-
minated employee was fired for filing a complaint with the state 
OSHA agency. One needs little imagination to presume that at least 
some employees concurred in the dischargee's complaints. 
If the employer can affirmatively establish the absence of con-
certed interest, the presumption could be rebutted, just as a union's 
presumption of continuing majority status may be overcome after 
the certification year. Midland Frame 149 is an example of the latter 
case. The employee in Midland Frame, a vocal advocate of homosex-
ual rights, was discharged for repeatedly challenging the employer's 
dress code by wearing tight-fitting satin pants and clothing with glit-
ter, and by his oral and written protests of the dress policy. The 
employer advised the employee that his gay rights activism would 
not affect his employment but that "business dress" was required on 
the job. The evidence demonstrated that other employees dis-
agreed with the dischargee's protest. 15o 
146. Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. 249, 251 
(1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 406 U.S. 272, 279 (1972); Bellingham 
Frozen Foods, 237 N.L.R.B. 1450, 1465 (1978), enforced, 626 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Miami Indus. Trucks, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1223, 1224 (1975). In addition to "continuity 
of the work force," a finding of successorship requires " 'substantial continuity of iden-
tity in the business enterprise,'" Howardjohnson, 417 U.S. at 263 (quotingjohn Wiley & 
Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964)), and continuity of the appropriate bar-
gaining unit, Burns, 406 U.S. at 280. See generally Note, The Bargaining Obligations of Succes-
sor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 759 (1975). 
147. See, e.g., Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 100, 103 (1954) (ordering an employer to 
bargain after losing representation election even though a majority of employees subse-
quently signed a letter stating that they no longer wanted union representation). 
148. 271 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1089 (1984); see supra text accompanying notes 53-55 . 
149. Midland Frame Div., Midland-Ross Corp., 216 N.L.R.B. 302, 305 (1975). 
150. Based on this evidence, and the terminated employee's own testimony that he 
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Providing an individual with protection for any work-related com-
plaint is a more far-reaching, and consequendy more troubling, ap-
proach. This protection arguably ignores entirely the "concerted" 
limitation of section 7's language. The term "concerted" could be 
characterized simply as repetitive of the broad scope read into sec-
tion 7's "mutual aid or protection" language. 151 Under this propo-
sal, however, the scope of "concerted" is not intended to be as 
expansive as "mutual aid or protection." 
The concert requirement is met by the assumption that any con-
cern regarding working conditions inevitably will impact current or 
future employees. An individual request for a raise, for example, 
ultimately will affect how much the employer will pay other employ-
ees or future employees in the same job. More attenuated individ-
ual protests, such as criticizing a presidential veto of legislation, 152 
would not satisfy the "concerted" requirement. Because the action 
of two employees othenvise meets the "concerted" criterion, how-
ever, their protest of a presidential veto would qualify for protection 
under the broader "mutual aid or protection" language. 153 
Defining what constitutes a "work-related" complaint is a prob-
lem easily resolved. Under a structural analysis, the communication 
right of the individual is the parallel of the right of the employees' 
representative to demand collective bargaining "with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 154 
Thus, any issue about which a union lawfully could demand bargain-
ing could be the subject of a protected individual complaint under 
section 7. The Board need only reference the substantial precedent 
and expertise developed to identify subjects of mandatory 
bargaining. 15 5 
The employee in Midland Frame, 156 for example, would be pro-
tected in his protest of the employer dress code, irrespective of 
had not solicited support from other employees, the Board adopted the Administrative 
Law Judge's finding that the employee's actions did not constitute protected concerted 
activity. See id. at 302-06. 
151. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. 
152. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1978); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 113-14. 
153. One objection to this result is the re-creation of the arbitrary distinction criti-
cized earlier between the actions of one employee versus two employees. The distinc-
tion was condemned, however, because it appeared counter-intuitive from the 
employees' perspectives. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. Expectations of 
protection for nonwork-related complaints are likely to be more tenuous or nonexistent. 
Other justifications for protecting individual work-related complaints similarly are ab-
sent when addressing the broad scope of issues that traditionally satisfy the "mutual aid 
or protection" provision. 
154. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). The employer's duty to bargain is imposed in sec-
tion 8(a)(5). Id. § 158(a)(5) (1982). 
155. See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 757-84 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983). 
156. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. 
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other employees' disagreement with his pos1t10n. The complaint 
could affect future employees who might agree with this employee's 
objections. The employee would not, of course, be protected from 
discharge if he repeatedly violated the company policy on business 
dress. The employee could properly complain about the rule but 
could not disobey supervisory authority. 
Such an expansive reading of section 7 is a necessary growth step 
for the NLRA. Union organization has been declining steadily since 
the mid-1950s such that unions now represent less than 20 percent 
of the workforce. 157 Prompted by the legislation's fiftieth anniver-
sary, commentators have described the Act as outmoded and out-
dated.158 For the 80 percent of the workforce that is unorganized, 
the scope of section 7 protection for concerted activity may be the 
only NLRA provision of any practical impact or significance. If the 
Act is to remain (or to be resurrected) as a vital and dynamic bill of 
rights for the American worker, the lone voice must be accorded the 
same status as the voice of two. Continuing refinements in the Act's 
application certainly are possible within the statutory scheme. The 
communication structure created, however, actually mandates the 
extended protection proposed to maintain the integrity of the Act. 
Some will disagree with the elevated, "constitution-like" role that 
this Article asserts the Act has and should continue to assume. 159 
Requiring full protection for all individual work-related complaints 
admittedly is a harder case to make than the rebuttable presumption 
approach suggested first. Those who demand a closer relationship 
to the "letter of the law" are unlikely to share the expanded vision 
157. Union organization peaked in 1954 when 25.4% of the workforce (34.7% of the 
nonagricultural workforce) belonged to a union. Union membership dropped to 19.7% 
(23.6% of the nonagricultural workforce) by 1978. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 412 (Dec. 1980). The most recent 
statistics available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show 19.9% of all employed indi-
viduals are represented by unions, although only 17.5% are actually union members. 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 219 
(1987). The discrepancy between union membership and union representation results 
from the fact that employees may be part of a represented bargaining unit without be-
coming union members if the collective bargaining agreement contains no union secur-
ity clause, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), or such clauses are illegal under a state's 
right-to-work law, see 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982). 
158. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON 
EDUCATION AND LABOR, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE FAILURE OF LABOR LAW-
A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS (Comm. Print 1984), reprinted in DAILY LABOR RE-
PORT (BNA) No. 193, at D-1 (Oct. 4, 1984); Craver, The NLRA at Fifty: From Youthful 
Exuberance to Middle-Aged Complacency, 36 LAB. LJ. 604 (1985); Dunlop, Legal Framework of 
Industrial Relations in the United States, DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA) No. 194, at E-1 (Oct. 7, 
1985) (address on October 2, 1985 at Conference on the Labor Board at Mid-Century, 
Washington, D.C.); Gould, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National Labor Relations Act: 
The Need for Labor Board and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. REv. 937, 939 (1986); Sum-
mers, Past Premises, supra note 12, at 14-23; Weiler, Reflections on the NLRA at Fifty, DAILY 
LABOR REPORT (BNA) No. 112, at E-1 (June 11, 1985) (address on May 30, 1985, before 
the Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators, Seattle, Washington); 
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1787-1803 (1983). 
159. For an excellent discussion of analogous problems for public employees, see 
Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1 (1987), exploring an individual's First Amendment protection for speaking out in 
the public workplace. 
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of the NLRA needed to support this second alternative. It is an is-
sue about which there has and can be much disagreement. Other 
students of the Act may be unwilling to go so far. 
III. Conclusion 
Any number of methods could have been chosen by Congress in 
1935 to protect and encourage union organization and employee 
rights. The structure that was chosen is the employee-employer dia-
logue. The Act unquestionably protects the communication right of 
the group, either jointly or through an authorized collective bar-
gaining representative. Without the protection of the single voice, 
that structure remains incomplete and ultimately unstable. Having 
observed retaliation against one fellow employee for her unwelcome 
complaints, other employees will be quickly silenced. Labor schol-
ars will know that the employee needed only the support of a friend 
to prevent her termination. The employees are likely to know only 
that someone was fired for voicing her criticisms. 
The stumbling block for some courts and the Board in extending 
the scope of section 7 is the language of the section itself. The word 
"concerted" must be given some meaning. Two possible defini-
tions, admittedly requiring a vision of the Act beyond any dictionary 
meaning, are suggested. The first presumes group interest when-
ever the individual's complaint could affect the terms and conditions 
of employment for at least one other employee. This presumption 
may be overcome in appropriate cases by evidence that others dis-
agreed with the individual's protest. The second approach to the 
"concerted" requirement also presumes group interest, but this 
presumption is irrefutable. Any employee complaint concerning 
terms or conditions of employment would be a protected communi-
cation. It is assumed that any employment-related request eventu-
ally will affect present or future employees in some way. 
Under this proposal, little is sought from the employer and much 
is gained for the employee. The employer no longer will be allowed 
to interfere with employee statutory rights to file agency complaints 
or to retaliate for complaints brought directly to the employer. The 
complaints themselves may be ignored entirely or resolved in any 
way the employer chooses. The employee is permitted to use the 
statutory procedures created for her own protection and to voice 
her concerns directly to her employer. The protection sought is so 
modest that the level of controversy caused by this issue surely must 
be hard for Mr. Ewing and Mr. Prill to understand. 
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